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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is based on Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended Title 78 chapter 2a Section 3 subparagraph 
(2)(i). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
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1. Whether or not the court erred in only allowing 
appellant to deduct $70.00 per month, and after July 1, 1994 only 
$35.00 per month where on a pro rate bases, figuring that the 
insurance he paid for covered four people, the defendant, his new 
wife and the two minor children, it cost the defendant $162.50 
per month to cover the children and not $70.00 or $35.00 as 
ordered by the court. 
2. Whether or not the court erred in ordering the appellant 
to only deduct one half of the court ordered cost of insurance 
after July 1, 1994, where the applicable child support schedules 
upon which the support obligation was calculated provided that 
they included the full cost of providing insurance for children 
and that the party providing the insurance would deduct the full 
cost from his support obligation. 
3. Whether or not the court erred in granting plaintiff a 
retroactive judgment based on a recalculation of the cost of 
providing health and dental insurance on the children back to 
February 16, 1994. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
These issues are questions of law and the appellate court 
would apply a correction of error standard. "A trial court's 
conclusions of law are reviewed on appeal for correctness. . ." 
Pasker V. Morse 254 Utah Adv. Rep.12: Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 
198. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended Section 78-45-7.2. 
2. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended Section 78-45-7.7, 
pre-July 1, 1994 and post-July 1, 1994 versions. 
3. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended Section 78-45-7.15, 
pre-July 1, 1994 and post-July 1, 1994 versions. 
4. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended Section 30-3-10.6. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a divorce case where the 
Appellant/Defendant petitioned the court for an order modifying 
the divorce decree in several particulars, but primarily because 
he had lost his high paying job from a layoff and needed the 
child support order in the decree of divorce adjusted 
accordingly. The court entered its order modifying the divorce 
decree on March 11, 1994. Shortly thereafter the 
Appellee/Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the March 11th order 
for several reasons. The court filed its order amending the 
March 11, 1994 order modifying Judgment and decree of divorce, on 
March 20, 1995. The Appellant appeals from that order amending 
the March 11, 1994 Order. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: The decree of divorce was filed 
August 14, 1991.(R. 21). Appellant's Petition for Relief was 
filed May 26, 1993.(R. 25). A Reply and Counter-Petition was 
filed June 25, 1993 by Appellee/Plaintiff seeking alleged back 
unpaid child support and an order requiring Appellant/Defendant 
to pay half of the child care expenses. A Reply to Counter-
Petition and Counterclaim to Counter-Petition was filed by 
Appellant/Defendant on August 17, 1993.(R. 47). 
Trial was held on February 16, 1994 before the Honorable 
Lynn W. Davis 
and the resulting Order Modifying Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
was filed March 11, 1994.(R. 65). Next the Appellee/Plaintiff 
filed her Motion to Strike the March 11th Order Modifying 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce on March 21, 1994.(R. 68). Even 
though the Appellee/Plaintiff called her pleading a Motion to 
Strike, the trial court considered it as though it was a Petition 
to Amend.(See T. 11/9 hearing page 19). The Appellant/Defendant 
filed his Opposing Memorandum to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike on 
May 12, 1994.(R. 84). The matters were set for trial on November 
9, 1994. The Honorable Judge Davis entered his Order Amending 
Order Modifying the March 11, 1994 Order Modifying Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce, on March 20, 1995.(R. 110). The 
Appellant/Defendant appeals from this March 20, 1995 Order. 
C. DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT: The trial court granted 
Appellee's Motion to strike in that the court struck its March 
11th, 1994 Order that allowed the Appellant to deduct his cost of 
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providing insurance from his child support obligation. The court 
did so because the Appellant had added his new wife to the 
policy. The court ordered that Appellant was only allowed to 
deduct $70.00 per month which was the difference between two 
plans offered by his Employer, an Employee Plus One Plan and an 
Employee Plus Two or More Plan, until July 1, 1994. And after 
July 1, 1994 the court ordered that Appellant only deduct $35.00 
per month for providing health and dental insurance on the 
children because of a change in the statutes. The court further 
awarded Appellee the sum of $2,567.00 as a retroactive judgment 
for arrearage in child support based on these changes back to 
February 1994.(R. 110) 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS: Mr. Bradford and Karen Bradford Hogan 
were married in the year 1986 and divorced in the year 1991. 
During their marriage they had two daughters. Mr. Bradford was 
about thirty three years old and Mrs. Bradford was Eighteen when 
they were married. Mr. Bradford is an electrical engineer and 
has worked for Bechtel corporation since 1981. In is work he has 
had to move frequently from job to job. This apparently caused 
stress in the marriage and in April of 1991 when Mr. Bradford 
came home for a visit from his temporary work site in Texas, his 
wife informed him she wanted a divorce. She had him go to 
attorney Donald Eyre's office in Nephi, where Mr. Eyre agreed to 
do a divorce for both of them based on a handwritten document or 
note the parties left with Mr. Eyre. Mr. Bradford paid Mr. Eyre 
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and went back to Texas. Later he received a prepared stipulation 
which he signed and returned. A default divorce was entered on 
the stipulation in August 1991 and Mr. Bradford proceeded to pay 
his child support as he understood it. In February 1992 he lost 
his per diem pay from Bechtel and he reduced his child support 
payments accordingly as he understood the divorce decree. He was 
laid off from work for part of 1992 and worked part of the year. 
Finally in December of 1992 Mr. Bradford was placed on holding 
status and started receiving unemployment compensation. In May 
of 1993 he was still unemployed and on holding status and he 
filed his Petition to modify the divorce decree on May 26, 1993, 
seeking a reduced child support payment and better visitation 
rights with his children because he lived in Texas and week-end 
visits and short holiday visits were not practical because of 
travel distances involved. Mrs. Bradford counter-petitioned 
demanding a contempt of court order and a judgment for arrearage 
based on her interpretation of the divorce decree among other 
demands for relief. After the trial on February 16, 1994, the 
court found that Mr. Bradford had correctly interpreted the 
divorce decree and had paid his child support in full, and that 
there were no arrearage owed. 
The court amended the Decree to provide for a new child 
support amount based on the unemployment income of Mr. Bradford 
and the imputed income of Mrs. Bradford. The court also made an 
order that it cost Mr. Bradford $325.00 per month to provide 
health and dental insurance on the minor children and pursuant to 
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U.C.A. section 78-45-7.7(b) he ordered that that sum should be 
subtracted from the ordered child support payable by Mr. 
Bradford. The court also ordered that both parties had an on 
going affirmative duty to file an affidavit if either parties 
income changed substantially and the court retained jurisdiction 
to amend the amount of child support ordered based on the 
affidavits of the parties. This was done to save time and travel 
expenses to all parties concerned and the trouble of having to 
file a Petition for modification and a court hearing each time 
ones employment changed. These orders and provisions were 
reduced to writing in the March 10, 1994 order filed herein on 
March 11, 1994. 
After the trial on February 16, 1994 Mr. Bradford was 
reemployed by Bechtel on or about February 22, 1994. Pursuant to 
the Court's Order he filed his affidavit showing his increased 
income and started paying his increased child support payments 
less the court ordered amount it cost him to furnish health and 
dental insurance, the sum of $325.00 per month. Meanwhile Mrs. 
Bradford filed a Motion to Strike the March 10, 1994 order 
because she alleged that Mr. Bradford had went back to work 
shortly after the February 16, 1994 trial (which was true and Mr. 
Bradford filed his required affidavit), and she alleged that Mr. 
Bradford should not be allowed to deduct the $325.00 per month 
for insurance because he had added his new wife to his insurance 
policy at work after he had filed his May 26, 1993 Petition. Mrs. 
Bradford alleged that Mr. Bradford had misrepresented that fact 
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to the court at the February 16th trial. These issues were 
brought to a head at the November 9, 1994 trial. (R. 90) and the 
court made oral rulings and required Mrs. Bradford to prepare a 
proposed order consistant with his rulings. 
Mr. Bradford objected to the proposed Order submitted by 
Mrs. Bradford (R. 99). The court ruled on the objection (R. 104) 
and signed the proposed Order Amending Order Modifying Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce. (R. 110). In the Order the court ruled 
that since Mr. Bradford's new wife was on the insurance plan, the 
Employee plus Two or More Plan> Mr. Bradford was not entitled to 
deduct the cost of the insurance i.e. $325.00 as ordered in the 
March 10, 1994 order, but rather only the difference between the 
cost of the Employee Plus One Plan and the Employee Plus Two or 
More Plan, or the sum of $70.00. In addition the Court ordered 
that child support payments would be recalculated back to 
February 1994 on the bases that insurance only cost Mr. Bradford 
$70.00 per month for the children, and that after July 1, 1994 he 
was only entitled to deduct one half of that sum or $35.00 which 
under the new statute represented Mrs. Bradfords obligation to 
pay for half of the insurance premium, the court then granted a 
retroactive Judgment in the sum of $2,567.00 to Mrs. Bradford. 
Mr. Bradford's affidavit filed in response to Mrs. 
Bradford's Motion to Strike (R. 78) States that he was reemployed 
by Bechtel on February 22, 1994 after returning from the February 
16, 1994 hearing. He also stated when his children were added to 
his insurance. Kristyn was enrolled on March 31, 1987 and 
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Katelynn was enrolled March 21, 1989. As a result he was required 
to purchase the Employee Plus Two or More plan which was costing 
him $325.00 per month. The attachment referred to in his 
affidavit (R. 77) shows that the Appellee/Defendant Mrs. Bradford 
was cancelled from the insurance coverage on August 31, 1991, 
corresponding to the divorce of the parties. But as a single man 
Mr. Bradford had to continue with the Employee Plus Two or More 
insurance plan in order to have his two daughters covered. His 
cost to do so regardless of whether or not his new wife Barbara 
was on the plan was $325.00 per month. He filed his Petition to 
modify the Divorce Decree in May 1993 and later added his new 
wife to the plan on July 9, 1993. The hearing on the May 1993 
Petition was held February 16, 1994. Mr. Bradford testified to 
the effect that in order to have his two daughters covered on his 
insurance he had to pay for the Employee Plus Two or More Plan. 
Mr. Bradford never testified that his new wife Barbara was not on 
the insurance, nor was he ever ask that question by Plaintiff's 
counsel, or the Court. 
At the November 9th, 1994 hearing Mr. Bradford was not 
present in order to save his job but the court accused him of 
misleading the court at the February 16th trial either 
negligently or intentionally. The parties pro-offered evidence 
concerning the insurance plans available to Mr. Bradford through 
his work in more detail and the court received it. At this 
hearing or trial and from the documents entered into evidence it 
was determined that Bechtel paid Mr. Bradford a Flex Credit that 
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basically paid for his insurance but the $325.00 per month paid 
for the Employee Plus Two or More Plan included the Flex 
Credit.(see T. 11/9 hearing page 31). In other words the $325.00 
deducted from Mr. Bradford's monthly pay for the Employee Plus 
Two or More Plan paid for the four people covered, i.e. Mr. 
Bradford and his new wife Barbara and the two children in 
question. Based thereon the court entered oral orders with a 
great deal of apparent animosity towards Mr. Bradford for his 
perceived misleading testimony in the court's view. (T. 11/9 
hearing pages 20-21). The court's oral orders were ultimately 
reduced to writing in the March 20, 1995 Order. (R. 110). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The court should have ordered that the cost of insurance 
i.e. $325.00 covered four people, the Appellant/Defendant, his 
new wife Barbara and his two children, and therefore on a per-
capita basis it cost Mr. Bradford $162.50 per month to provided 
health and dental insurance for his two children. 
2. The court correctly determined that the Pre-July 1, 1994 
schedules applied in this case and should have followed pre-July 
1, 1994 law that provided that those child support guidelines 
included the cost of furnishing insurance for children and if a 
party furnished insurance otherwise then he should deduct the 
full cost of the children's portion of the insurance furnished 
from his child support obligation and not just half of the cost 
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of the children's portion after July 1, 1994. 
3. The court should have recognized that it had no 
authority to retroactively change the March 10, 1994 Order, 
particularly where Mr. Bradford had timely made his support 
payments consistent with that order. The court erred in granting 
Appellee/Plaintiff a retroactive judgment against Mr. Bradford 
based on a new finding as to how much it cost to furnish 
insurance. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court in this case erred in several respects. First it 
failed to recognize that both law and equity required it to 
determine the cost of providing medical and dental insurance on 
the two children at least on a per-capita basis, and not on the 
difference between the Employee Plus One Plan and the Employee 
Plus Two or More Plan. And the Court erred in only allowing Mr. 
Bradford to deduct one half of that difference after July 1, 
1994. 
Statutory law prior to July 1, 1994 provided that the cost 
of medical and dental insurance was included in the base combined 
child support tables.(see U.C.A 78-45-7.15(1), pre-July 1, 1994 
version). This prior provision provided that the children's 
portion of medical and dental insurance paid by a parent was thus 
subtracted from that parent's base child support obligation if it 
was otherwise provided by the Obligor parent. (See U.C.A 78-45-
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7.7(b), pre-July 1994 version). It follows that where Mr. 
Bradford provides insurance for the children through a payroll 
deduction, the cost of the children's portion of the insurance 
premium must be subtracted from the child support payments he is 
ordered to pay, otherwise he will be paying twice for the 
children's insurance. Once when the cost is deducted from his 
paycheck and once when he pays his child support. (See also the 
child support work sheet, used at that time R. 76). 
On the other hand post July 1, 1994 statutory law follows a 
different scheme. The cost of providing health and dental 
insurance is not included in the child support guidelines. (See 
Post July 1, 1994 U.C.A 78-45-7.15). Post law provides that each 
party shall pay one half of the cost of insurance on the 
children.{78-45-7.15(3)}. Where there is an obligor parent 
paying child support who is also providing health insurance 
through payroll deduction, then the cost of insurance can be 
handled one of two possible ways. The obligor parent can pay his 
child support each month and the obligee parent can send the 
obligor parent a payment each month in return for one half of the 
cost of health and dental insurance. Or the Obligor parent can 
simply deduct one half of the cost from his child support 
payment. This later possibility gives rise to the idea that after 
July 1, 1994 the Obligor parent can only subtract one half of the 
cost of providing insurance. In reality since the schedules do 
not include the cost of providing insurance an Obligor parent is 
not really subtracting half the cost from his child support 
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obligation, he is really just collecting from the Obligee parent 
half of the cost he has in furnishing insurance which he pays in 
addition to child support. The Court in this case Ordered that 
after July 1, 1994 Mr. Bradford could only deduct one half of his 
cost of providing medical and dental insurance on the two 
children, apparently following the above reasoning. 
The post July 1, 1994 schedules and statutes are not 
applicable to the issues. This is clear from reading the 
provisions of U.C.A 78-45-7,2(6), both pre and post July 1, 1994 
versions. Both versions say that "With regard to child support 
orders, enactment of the guidelines and any subsequent change in 
the guidelines constitutes a substantial or material change of 
circumstances as a grounds for modification or adjustment of a 
court order, if there is a difference of at least 25% between the 
existing order and the guidelines....". Thus the new version of 
the statute in this area is not applicable until there has been a 
substantial or material change of circumstances AFTER the July 1, 
1994 law went into effect. There was no allegation of such a 
change, and no evidence or claim of a change after that date. 
The Petition that triggered this trial was filed by Mr. Bradford 
on May 26, 1993, and Mrs. Bradford's Counter-Petition for alleged 
back child support based on her interpretation of the divorce 
decree was filed June 25, 1993. Her order to show cause was 
filed August 17, 1993 and her Motion to Strike was filed March 
21, 1994 (R. 68). None of these pleadings alleged a material 
change in circumstances after July 1, 1994. In fact the attorney 
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for Mrs. Bradford conceded in open court that the Pre-July 1, 
1994 child support schedules applied to the issues in this case 
because the change in the guidelines did not exceed the court 
ordered amount by at least 25%. (T. 11/9 hearing, page 56, lines 
7-21). 
Pre-July 1, 1994 law at U.C.A 78-45-7.15 (1) which outlines 
the process of filling the work sheets and figuring the amount of 
child support payable by an Obligor parent provides that "Only 
the costs of health and dental insurance premiums for children 
are included in the base combined child support obligation 
table." U.C.A. 78-45-7.7(2)(b) pre-July 1 version, provides 
"calculate each parents proportionate share of the base combined 
child support obligation . . . and SUBTRACTING from the products 
the children's portion of any monthly payments made directly by 
each parent for medical and dental insurance premiums" (Emphasis 
added). Thus put in other words the statutes clearly spell out 
that the cost of health and dental insurance was included in the 
child support guidelines prior to July 1, 1994, and that the 
parent providing the insurance would subtract the cost of the 
children's portion from his or her child support obligation each 
month before payment. 
As admitted by Mrs. Bradford's attorney at the November 9, 
1994 hearing, the Pre-July 1, 1994 law and schedules were 
applicable and the court should have continued to apply the 
provisions of pre-July 1, 1994 law on the subject of whether or 
not Mr. Bradford could deduct the cost of furnishing insurance. 
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There remains the issue of whether or not Mr. Bradford 
should of been allowed to deduct the per-capita cost of 
furnishing the insurance for the children or only allowed to 
deduct the difference between Employee Plus One and the Employee 
Plus Two or More plans. Mr. Bradford attempted to introduce 
evidence at the November 9, 1994 hearing that the reasonable cost 
of providing medical and dental insurance for two children in 
this day and age is certainly more than $70.00 per month. But 
the Court ruled that the evidence was not relevant.(T. 11/9 
hearing page 38-45). Even without that evidence on the 
reasonable value of providing insurance for children, it is 
submitted that judicial notice can be taken of the fact that in 
today's markets for insurance it can not be provided for $70.00 
per month. And the fact that Metropolitan Insurance company 
provides Bechtel employees two plans, one covering the employee 
plus one person, and one covering the employee plus two or more, 
does not mean that the difference between the two is the cost of 
insuring two children as the lower court concluded. 
The statutes in question again answer the question. Pre-
July 1, 1994 version of U.C.A 78-45.7.7(b) provides that the 
obligor parent would deduct the children's PORTION of any 
monthly payments made directly for medical and dental insurance 
premiums. The word Portion means "share" as used. Thus in this 
case where four people are actually covered, the cost for two 
children is half of the total premium paid out by Mr. Bradford, 
or $162.50 per month. Not $70.00 per month as ordered by the 
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court. 
A reading of the Post July 1, 1994 version of the statute 
U.C.A. 78-45-7.15(4) makes it clear that this is what was 
intended. It says "The children's PORTION of the premium is a PER 
CAPITA share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense 
for the children shall be calculated by dividing the premium 
amount by the number of persons covered under the policy and 
multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant 
case." ( Emphasis added). If this formula is followed in this 
case, the cost of medical and dental insurance for the two 
children is $162.50 per month. 
The lower court's order of March 20, 1995 also granted 
Appellee/Plaintiff a retroactive judgment to March 10, 1994 in 
the sum of $2,567.00. This sum was based on the court's ruling 
that Mr. Bradford should have only been entitled to deduct $70.00 
per month from his ordered child support obligation until July 1, 
1994 and only $35.00 per month after July 1, 1994, instead of the 
court ordered amount of $325.00 as ordered in the March 10, 1994 
Order modifying the original decree of divorce. This 
retroactive judgment was based on the tabulation attached to the 
courts order of March 20, 1995, (R. 105). Child support awards 
become judgments when they become due {U.C.A. 30-3-10.6(1)}. Mr. 
Bradford paid his child support payments exactly as ordered by 
the court in the March 10, 1994 order, and the court erred in 
thereafter entering a retroactive judgment increasing those 
payments. In Whitehead vs. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 and Cummings 
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vs. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, the Courts considered retroactive 
child support orders and held that child support orders become 
judgments and retroactive relief from child support orders is not 
allowed, quoting several cases. 
If retroactive action is justified for any reason, the lower 
court still erred in only allowing Mr. Bradford to deduct $70.00 
per month for furnishing insurance until July 1, 1994, and $35.00 
per month thereafter because the per capita cost of furnishing 
the insurance was at least $162.50 per month. Please see the 
arguments set forth above. Any retroactive child support 
calculations should be based on the same reasoning as prospective 
child support orders. 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The May 1993 Petition and Counter-Petition framed the issues 
of the February 16, 1994 Trial. Based on the evidence and 
testimony offered the court found that the Appellant/Defendant 
had fully paid his child support according to the Decree of 
Divorce. The court amended the amount of the child support 
according to the parties incomes at the time and ordered that the 
Appellant/Defendant was entitled to deduct his cost of the 
children's health and dental cost, and ordered that amount was 
$325.00 per month. The Appellee/Plaintiff filed a motion to 
strike the March 10th Order and at the November 9th trial the 
court retroactively redid the Order based on the February 16, 
1994 trial. The court ordered that the Appellant/Defendant 
should have only deducted $70.00 per month for providing health 
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and dental insurance up to July 1, 1994 and $35.00 per month 
thereafter because that was the difference between the Employee 
Plus one Plan and the Employee Plus Two or More Plan offered. 
The court awarded the Appellee/Plaintiff a retroactive 
deficiency judgment. 
The court should have followed pre-July 1, 1994 law that 
provided that the child support guidelines in effect at that time 
included the cost of furnishing insurance for children and if a 
party furnished insurance otherwise then he should deduct the 
full cost of the insurance furnished from his child support 
obligation. The court should have ordered that the cost of 
insurance i.e. $325.00 covered four people, the 
Appellant/Defendant, his new wife Barbara and his two children, 
and therefore on a per-capita basis it cost the 
Appellant/Defendant Mr. Bradford $162.50 per month to provided 
health and dental insurance for his two children. 
Mr. Bradford, Appellant/Defendant seeks relief from the 
lower courts March 20, 1995 order. He seeks an order of this 
Court allowing him to deduct the per capita cost of providing 
medical and dental insurance for his two children or $162.50 per 
month, from his court ordered child support obligation. He seeks 
an order specifying that the order be prospective only from the 
date of Mrs. Bradford's Motion to Strike, which the lower court 
treated as a Petition to Amend. He also seeks and order of this 
Court reversing the lower courts retroactive judgment for 
$2,567.00. 
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Dated this day of 1995. 
Dexter L Anderson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have mailed Four copies of the 
forgoing Appellants Brief to Marvin D. Bagley, Attorney for 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 180 North 100 East,, Suite F, Richfield, Utah 
84701, postage prepaid this day of 1995. 
Dexter L Anderson 
ADDENDUM 
DEXTER L. ANDERSON, #0084 
Attorney at Law 
Star Route Box 52 
750 South Highway 99 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
(801) 743-6522 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
EST AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN MARIE BRADFORD, : ORDER MODIFYING 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
: OF DIVORCE 
vs. : 
WILLIAM RICHARD BRADFORD, : Civil No. 8677 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter came on before the Court for non-jury trial on February 16, 
1994, pursuant to the Courts notice of trial setting served on both parties. The Plaintiff was 
present and was represented by her attorney Donald Eyre. The Defendant was present and was 
represented by his attorney Dexter L. Anderson. The issues tried were raised by Defendant's 
Petition for Relief from Decree of Divorce or Modification, dated May 25,1993; Plaintiffs 
Reply and Counter-Petition datedJune24,1993; Defendants Reply to Counter-Petition dated 
August 17,1993; and also Plaintiffs Order to Show Cause dated July 26, 1993. 
The Court having heard the testimony of both Plaintiff and Defendant and having 
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received evidence and exhibits and having reviewed the file herein, hereby enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Order of Modification. 
1. The Court finds that there has been a substantial change of circumstances since 
the decree of divorce was entered, in the parties relative circumstances. 
a) Primarily the Defendant has suffered loss of his employment as an 
Electrical Engineer with Bechtel Corporation, and had been without employment since about 
December of 1992, as of the time he filed his Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree. The 
Defendant was put to work again during July, August, October and November of 1993 by 
Bechtel, but was again placed on holding status and remains on holding status. While 
unemployed he receives $490.00 every two weeks unemployment benefits. With unemployment 
and earnings from wages he had gross earnings of $23,050.00 in 1993. 
b) The court finds that the Defendant also lost his per diem pay from Bechtel 
during February 1992, when his status was changed from temporary to permanent employment 
in Texas instead of Utah. 
c) The Court finds that the Plaintiff has gained employable skills since the 
divorce and has been employed as a secretary earning about $11,000.00 a year, though at the 
time of the trial she was unemployed, and receiving $140.00 a week unemployment benefits. 
d) The Court finds that the defendant is actively seeking work in his field as 
an Electrical Engineer both with Bechtel as well as with other companies in the same field, and 
with the Defendant's education and work experiences he should shortly be re-employed. 
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e) The Court finds that because of the distance between the permanent 
places of residence of the parties the Defendant should be granted additional and extended 
visitations with the parties children, particularly in light of the fact that the children are older 
now and there appears to be a wholesome love and affection between the Defendant and his 
children. 
f) In addition, while there has been telephone visits between the Defendant 
and the children, the Court finds that the Defendant is entitled to liberal and unrestricted 
telephone visits with the children, and specifically that the children should be able to call their 
father, the Defendant at reasonable times. 
g) The Court finds that based on the circumstances of the parties, each 
should receive the benefit of one child deduction for income tax purposes. 
h) The Court finds that the Defendant should continue to provide health and 
dental insurance for the children through his employment, but the deductible and co-pay 
amounts applicable to the coverage should be paid one half by each party. 
i) The Court finds that the Divorce Decree provides that in the event the 
Defendant's employer discontinues per diem payments, child support would be reduced to 
$600.00 a month, and that this provision applied Vregardless of whether or not one or two ^ c ^ 
years had passed from the date of the Divorce Decree. 
j) The Court finds that based on the above interpretation of the Divorce 
Decree, the loss of per diem to the Defendant during February 1992, and the payments actually 
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made by the Defendant to the Plaintiff for child support, there is no arrearage due Plaintiff 
from Defendant, and Plaintiffs claim for arrearage in her Counter Petition should be overruled 
and denied. 
k) The Court finds that each party should bear their own cost of Court and 
attorney's fees. 
Based on the foregoing findings, and the Court being otherwise fully advised; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that the Decree of Divorce herein shall 
be and is hereby modified to provide; 
1. The Defendant shall have liberal reasonable visitation with the parties children 
including, but not limited to 
a) A six week extended visitation during the summer months, during 
vacations from school. The Defendant shall give the Plaintiff reasonable notice as to when the 
visit shall take place. 
b) A Christmas visit every other Christmas, beginning with Christmas 1994. 
He shall give Plaintiff reasonable notice of any such visit and the dates involved. 
c) The Defendant shall provide the transportation necessary to facilitate the 
visitations both to and from the Defendant's home. 
d) The Defendant is entitled to abatement of child support payments 
consistent with U.CA.§78-45-7.11. 
2. The Defendant shall pay child support to the Plaintiff for the support of the 
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parties children, consistent with the child support obligation guidelines, as follows. Initially 
pursuant to this order child support shall be based on an average 1993 gross income imputed 
to the Defendant of $23,050.00 and an average 1993 gross income imputed to the Plaintiff of 
$ 11,000.00, with the Defendant furnishing health and dental insurance for the children costing 
$138.70 every two weeks or $300.00 every month. The Defendant shall pay Plaintiff the sum 
of $169.00 a month for both children, plus providing said health and dental insurance. Said 
obligation shall be retroactive to the date of filing this petition, to wit; May 1993, and shall 
continue in said sums until modified. 
3. This Court retains continuing jurisdiction concerning child support obligations 
as follows: Defendant's support obligation shall change consistent with the child support 
guidelines whenever the Plaintiff s or the Defendant's employment changes from current status 
for a period of time over 30 days by re-employment or new employment. Within thirty days 
after there has been a change of employment status, that party shall report the same to their 
respective counsel and cause an affidavit attesting to the facts to be prepared. Said affidavit 
shall be served on opposing counsel, and that party may respond by affidavit within ten days. 
Both parties shall also submit their calculation on a new child support obligation worksheet 
and this matter shall be submitted to the Court for determination of a new order of support 
based on the change(s) in employment status, without the necessity of a petition for 
modification or for a hearing requiring extensive travel on the part of any party. 
4. Each party shall pay one half of any child care expense actually incurred by the 
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Plaintiff as may be necessary to enable her to maintain full time employment. Said child care 
expense must be incurred at a licensed or certified day care center or person, and Defendant's 
one half share shall be paid by the Defendant upon presentment of invoices prepared by such 
a center or person providing the child care. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs 
Counterpetition and Order To Show Cause is overruled and denied. Each party is to bear his 
or her own Court cost and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
All other provisions of the Divorce Decree shall remain the same unless otherwise 
changed or modified by this order. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
MODIFYING JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE on the P^1^ day of 
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DONALD J. EYRE JR. 
Attorney at Law 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
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Secretary 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
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Telephone: 623-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN MARIE BRADFORD, 
Plaintiff, : ORDER AMENDING ORDER 
MODIFYING JUDGMENT AND 
vs. : DECREE OF DIVORCE 
WILLIAM RICHARD BRADFORD II, : Civil No. 8 677 
Defendant. : 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 
plaintiff's Motion to Strike Order Modifying Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce on November 9, 1994 before the Honorable Lynn Davis, 
District Court Judge. 
The plaintiff was present and represented by her attorney, 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., and the defendant was not present but was 
represented by his attorney, Dexter L. Anderson. 
The Court having heard the proffers of testimony of both 
plaintiff and defendant and arguments of counsel and having 
reviewed the exhibit proffered by both the plaintiff and the 
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defendant hereby finds as follows: 
1. Any Order entered by the Court should attempt to benefit 
to the fullest the two minor children of the parties herein. 
2. The defendant presently works and lives in Maryland and 
based upon an affidavit filed by him presently has a gross monthly 
earning capacity of $3,795,00. The plaintiff presently lives in 
Nevada and at the time of the hearing had an imputed gross income 
of $916.00 monthly. Since the hearing date, the plaintiff has 
obtained a new job with a gross monthly income of $2,000.00. 
3. If at the time of the hearing of February 16, 1994 the 
Court would have known that the defendant's current wife was 
covered under his insurance, it would not have attributed the full 
amount of the insurance premium to the children, and permitted the 
defendant to deduct the full amount of the premium from his child 
support obligation, as was set forth in the Order Modifying 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce dated March 10, 1994. 
4. The Court didn't have before it all the relevant facts on 
February 16, 1994 and therefore said Order should be modified 
retroactively back to the date of the hearing. 
5. The defendant should only be permitted to deduct the 
difference between the premium for Employee Plus One Plan and the 
premium for Employee Plus Two Plan as set forth in the defendant's 
medical and dental insurance policies as provided by his employer, 
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from his child support obligation. 
6. Since the hearing in February, 1994 the Utah Legislature 
has modified the applicable statute with respect to the deduction 
of insurance premiums as set forth in Section 78-45-7.15 U.C.A. 
1953 as amended, which permits the deduction of only one-half of 
the insurance premium from the child support obligation and 
therefore from July 1, 1994 the defendant may only deduct one-half 
of the insurance premium attributable to the children as set forth 
herein above. 
7. The plaintiff is entitled to a deficiency judgment against 
the defendant for the difference between what the defendant should 
have paid in child support and what he did pay. Said amounts are 
set forth in Schedule "A" attached hereto and by this reference 
made a part hereof. 
Based upon the above findings it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
and DECREED as follows: 
1. Based upon the incomes of the parties, the base child 
support amount through November 19, 1994 should be $673.00 with a 
deduction for the insurance premium attributed to the children of 
$70.00, which amount is stipulated by the parties, for any adjusted 
base child support of $603.00 through July, 1, 1994 and $638.00 
thereafter based upon the deduction of one-half of the insurance 
premium attributable to the children. 
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2. From November, 1994 forward, based upon the new income of 
the plaintiff of $2,000.00 per month, the base child support 
awarded is $642.00 minus the $35.00 for an adjusted base child 
support amount of $607.00, which shall be the amount that shall be 
paid from this date forward until further modified. 
3. The plaintiff is awarded judgment for arrearage in the 
amount of $2,567.00, which amount shall be paid by the defendant 
within the next 12 months. 
4. Each party is ordered to assume and be responsible for 
their own attorney's fees. 
5. Any provision of the Order dated March 10, 1994 not 
otherwise modified or amended herein is in full force and effect. 
6. Based upon the stipulation of the parties, it is further 
ORDERED that the plaintiff may have access to any and all insurance 
records involving the children. Each party is urged and ordered 
not to speak disparagingly of the other party before the children 
and the plaintiff is ordered to use the Bradford surname in all 
records involving the children. 
Dated this /2*- day of J^/X-^ , 1994. 
// District Ju'dge 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order 
Amending Order Modifying Judgment and Decree of Divorce to Dexter 
L. Anderson, Attorney for Defendant, Star Route Box 52, 750 South 
Highway 99, Fillmore, Utah 84 631 on this / $'J-*L, day of 
November, 1994. 
BY (S6PL*UJ&_ 7^/^J^L^ 
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EXHIBIT "A" Retro-Active Child Support 
November 13, 1994 
Dates 
[FEB. 22 (ins. $70.00) 
1 MARCH 5 
I MARCH 20 
1 APRIL 5 
1 APRIL 20 
J MAY 5 
1 MAY 20 
J JUNE 5 
\JUNE 20 
\ JULY 5 (ins. 35.00) 
J JULY 20 
1 AUGUST 5 
J AUGUST 20 
J SEPTEMBER 5 
1 SEPTEMBER 20 
J OCTOBER 5 
[J OCTOBER 20 
[NOVEMBER 5 
1TOTAL 1 
1 Child 
Support 
J Owed 
| $ 301.50 
$ 301.50 
$ 301.50 
$ 301.50 
| $ 301.50 
| $ 301.50 
S 301.50 
S 150.75 
$ 150.75 
$ 159.50 
S 319.00 
$ 319.00 
$ 319.00 
$ 319.00 
$ 319.00 
$ 319.00 
$ 319.00 
$ 319.00 | 
$-5,123.50l 
Child 
Support 
|_Sent_ _ 
$ 128.00 
$ 84.50 
$ 84.50 
$ 84.50 
$ 174.00 
$ 174.00 
$ 174.00 
$ 87.00 
$ 87.00 
$ 87.00 
$ 174.00 
$ 174.00 
$ 174.00 
$ 174.00 
$ 174.00 
$ 174.00 
$ 174.00 
$ 174.00 
$ 2 , 5 5 6 . 5 0 ] 
| Child 
Support 
1 Difference || 
$ 173.50 J 
| $ 217.00 j 
$ 217.00 J 
$ 217.00 J 
$ 127.501 
$ 127.50 J 
$ 127.50 J 
\S 63.75 j 
$ 63.75 || 
S 72.501 
$ 145.001 
$ 145.00 J 
$ 145.00 J 
$ 145.00 j 
$ 145.00 j 
S 145.00 J 
$ 145.00 J 
$ 145.001 
S 2 ,567 .0( j 
673.00 monthly 
-70.00 insurance (as per Judges Decision) 
603.00 TOTAL monthly (from Feb. 22 to July 1) 
301.50 Bi-Weekly 
673.00 monthly 
-35.00 insurance (from July 5 on) 
638.00 TOTAL monthly (from July 5 t o November 19) 
319.00 Bi-Weekly 
s3B30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order - Judgment.sOB 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support 
under any child support order, as defined by Subsection 
62A-11-40M3) , is, on and after the date it is dues 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any 
judgment of a district court, except as provided in Subsection 
(2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in 
this and in any other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any 
other jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support 
order may be modified with respect to any period during which a 
petition for modification is pending, but only from the date 
notice of that petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor 
is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the 
petitioner. 
(3) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" means a 
state or political subdivision, a territory or possession of the 
United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico. 
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be 
effective and enforceable as a lien against the real property 
interest of any third party relying on the public record, shall 
be docketed in the district court in accordance with Sections 
78-22-1 and 62A-11-311. 
s3BHistory: C. 1953, 30-3-10.6, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 117, l;sOB 
S3B1988, ch. 1, 3; 1988, ch. 203, 1; 1989, ch. 62, 1; ch. 115,sOB 
s3B l.sOB 
s3B NOTES TO DECISIONSsOB 
s3BAna1ysissOB 
Retroactive modification. 
Cited. 
s3BRetroactive modification«sOB 
The general rule is to prohibit retroactive modification of 
family support obligations; thus temporary support orders may not 
be retroactively modified. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
s3BCited sOBin McReynolds v. McReynolds, 787 P.2d 530 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d 741 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
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(c) 1953-1995 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
Thornblad v. Thornblad, 849 P.2d 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
Nunley v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
s3B COLLATERAL REFERENCESsOB 
s3BA.L.R.sOB — Spouse's right to set off debt owed by other spouse 
against accrued spousal or child support payments, 11 A.L.R.Sth 
259. 
(c) 1953-1995 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
s3B78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines - Rebuttal.sOB 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative 
order establishing or modifying an award of child support entered 
on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a 
rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of 
temporary or permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and 
considerations required by the guidelines, the 3L^4Ard amounts 
resulting from the application of the guidelines, and the use of 
worksheets consistent with these guidelines Are presumed to be 
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record 
supporting the conclusion that complying with a provision of the 
guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from use of the 
guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best 
interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut 
the presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who 
live in the home of that parent and Are not children in common to 
both parties may at the option of either party be taken into 
account under the guidelines in setting or modifying a child 
support AV4Ard9 as provided in Subsection (5). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute 
the obligations of the respective parents for the additional 
children. The obligations shall then be subtracted from the 
appropriate parent's income before determining the A^4Ard in the 
instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, 
consideration of natural or adoptive children other than those in 
common to both parties may be applied to mitigate an increase in 
the A¥4Ard but may not be applied to justify a decrease in the 
award. 
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment of the 
guidelines and any subsequent change in the guidelines 
constitutes a substantial or material change of circumstances as 
a ground for modification or adjustment of a court order, if 
there is a difference of at least 25% between the existing order 
and the guidelines. In cases enforced under IV-D of Title IV of 
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., the 
office may request modification, in accordance with the 
requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988, Public Law 
100—485, no more often than once every three years. 
s3BHistory: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L. 1989, ch. 214, 4;sOB 
S3B1990, ch. 100, 35 1990, ch. 275, 2; 1994, ch. 118, 4.sOB 
s3BAdministrative Rules. sOB- This section is implemented by, 
interpreted by, or cited as authority for the following 
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(c) 1953-1995 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
administrative rule(s): R495-879, R527-231. 
s3BAmendment Notes.sOB - The 1990 amendment by ch. 100, effective 
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (4), which had r^and "(a) A 
noncustodial parent's obligation to provide child support for 
natural born or adopted children of a second family arising 
subsequent to entry of an existing child support order may not be 
considered to lower the child support awarded to the first family 
in the existing order. 
"(b) If the custodial parent of the first family petitions to 
increase child support, all natural born and adopted children of 
the noncustodial parent may be considered in determining whether 
to increase the award," and added Subsection (5). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 275, effective October 13, 1990, in 
Subsection (1) deleted the designation (a) and deleted former 
Subsection (b), which read "Neither the enactment of the 
guidelines or any consequent impact of the guidelines on existing 
child support orders constitute a substantial or material change 
of circumstances as a ground for modification of a court order 
existing prior to July 1, 1989. However, if the court finds a 
material change of circumstances independent of the guidelines, 
the guidelines may be applied to modify a court order existing 
prior to July 1, 1989," and added Subsection (5). 
The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "and the 
use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines" in Subsection 
(2)(b>; in Subsection (6), inserted "or adjustment" in the first 
sentence and substituted "In cases enforced under IV—D of Title 
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq." for 
"With regard to IV-D cases" at the beginning of the second 
sentence; and made stylistic changes. 
s3BFederal Law.sOB - The Family Support Act of 1988, Public Law 
100—485, cited in Subsection (6), amended various sections 
throughout Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 601 
et seq. 
s3BEffective Dates.sOB - Laws 1989, ch. 214 became effective on April 
24, 1989, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
s3B NOTES TO DECISIONSsOB 
s3BAna1ysissOB 
Modification of award. 
— Change in circumstances. 
Other children. 
s3BModification of award.sOB 
2 
(c) 1953-1995 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
When the parties had agreed to the amount of child support 
before the effective date of the child support guidelines, the 
trial court erred in modifying child support when no petition to 
modify had been filed and in modifying the support amount without 
finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred 
since the previous order had been entered, Bailey v. Adams, 798 
P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ??? (applying Subsection (l)(b) of 
this section prior to 1990 amendment regarding impact of 
guidelines on existing support orders). 
The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to 
apply the presumptive guidelines set forth in this chapter and 
determined child support outside the guidelines without finding 
there were special circumstances that justified deviation. Hill 
v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
s3B- Change in circumstances«sOB 
Factors other than a change in relative income affecting the 
child support calculation can constitute a material change in 
circumstances allowing the court, on a modification petition, to 
reach the issue of whether a deviation from the guidelines is now 
appropriate, Significant changes in the factual circumstances of 
the child, such as special education or health needs, which, if 
in existence at the time of the original decree, would have 
permitted an upward deviation from the guidelines in a 
modification proceeding. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
s3B0ther children.sOB 
This section does not mandate that the trial court give credit 
for children living in the obligee's current home; rather, the 
trial court has the ability to determine whether or not other 
children will be considered in determining the amount of support. 
Jensen v. Bowcut, 261 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
s3B COLLATERAL REFERENCESsOB 
s3BUtah Law Review.sOB - From Guesswork to Guidelines - The Adoption 
of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 
859. 
(c) 1953-1995 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
s3B78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations.sOB 
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be divided 
between them in proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, 
unless the low income table is applicable. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split 
custody as defined in Section 78-45-2 and in cases where the 
obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less monthly, the 
base child support award shall be determined as follows: 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and 
determine the base combined child support obligation using the 
base combined child support obligation table. 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base 
combined child support obligation by multiplying the combined 
child support obligation by each parent's percentage of combined 
adjusted gross income. 
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the 
obligor is between $650 and $1,050, the base child support award 
shall be the lesser of the amount calculated in SLCZzardAnae with 
Subsection (2) and the amount calculated using the low income 
table. 
(4) The base combined child support obligation table 
provides combined child support obligations for up to six 
children. For more than six children, additional amounts may be 
added to the base child support obligation shown. Unless rebutted 
by Subsection 78-45-7.2(3), the amount ordered shall not be less 
than the amount which would be ordered for up to six children. 
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is 
$649 or less, the court or administrative agency shall determine 
the amount of the child support obligation on a case-by—case 
basis, but the base child support award shall not be less than 
$20. 
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support amount for 
the total number of children, not an amount per child. 
s3BHistory: C. 1953, 78-45-7.7, enacted by L. 1989, ch. 214, 9;sOB 
S3B1990, ch. 100, 6; 1994, ch. 118, S.sOB 
s3BAmendment Notes.sOB - The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
1990, deleted former Subsection (2)(c), which read "allocate any 
known uninsured extraordinary medical expenses to be incurred on 
behalf of the children equally to each parent," and redesignated 
the following subsections accordingly; deleted "after subtracting 
federal tax credits" from the beginning of Subsection (2)(c); 
substituted "amount allocated in Subsection (2)(c)" for "two 
amounts allocated in Subsections (2)(c) and (d)" and "both" for 
"all three" in Subsection (2)(d); substituted "ten" for "six" in 
the first and second sentences in Subsection (3); and made minor 
stylistic changes throughout. 
The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, added "unless the 
1 
(c) 1953-1995 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
low income table is applicable" at the end of Subsection (1); 
inserted "and in cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income 
is $1,050 or less monthly" and substituted "base" for "total" in 
the introductory language of Subsection (2); inserted "combined" 
the second time the word appears in Subsection (2)(a); deleted 
"and subtracting from the products the children's portion of any 
monthly payments made directly by each parent for medical and 
dental insurance premiums" at the end of Subsection (2){b); 
deleted former Subsections (2)(c) and (2)(d) relating to the 
calculation of the child support award; added present Subsections 
(3) and (5) and redesignated the subsections accordingly; in 
present Subsection (4), substituted "six children" for "ten 
children" in two places, substituted "may" for "shall" in the 
second sentence and added the third sentence; and made stylistic 
changes. 
s3BEffective Dates.sOB - Laws 1989, ch. 214 became effective on April 
24, 1989, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
s3B NOTES TO DECISIONSsOB 
s3BCited sOBin Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
(c) 1953-1995 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
s3B78-45-7.15. Medica1 expenses.sOB 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical 
expenses of the minor children be provided by a parent if it is 
available at a reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain 
insurance for medical expenses, the court or administrative 
agency may consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(c) coverage of the policy; and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the 
out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for 
the children's portion of insurance. 
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita 
share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the 
children shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by 
the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying 
the result by the number of children in the instant case. 
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all 
reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses, including 
deductibles and copayments, incurred for the dependent children. 
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide 
verification of coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of 
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the 
dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of each 
calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the 
Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of insurance 
carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 ca.l&nd^Lr days of the date 
he first knew or should have known of the change. 
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide 
written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses 
to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the 
court, a parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the 
right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other 
parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply 
with Subsections (6) and (7). 
s3BHistory: C. 1953, 78-45-7.15, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 118, sOB 
s3B16; 1995, ch. 258, 14.sOB 
s3BAdministrative Rules. sOB- This section is implemented by, 
interpreted by, or cited as authority for the following 
administrative rule(s): R527-201. 
s3BRepeals and Reenactments.sOB - Laws 1994, ch. 118, 16 repeals 
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(c) 1953-1995 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
former 78-45-7.15, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch. 100, 11, 
relating to medical expenses, and enacts the present section, 
effective July 1, 1994. 
s-3BAmendment Notes.sOB - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
deleted "and actually paid by the parents" after "children" at 
the end of Subsection (5). 
(c) 1953-1995 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
